The 2011 Marketing Freedom for Grain Farmers Act deregulated Canadian grain markets and removed the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) as the sole buyer and seller of Canadian grain. We develop a rational expectations contract decision model that serves as the basis for an empirically informed simulation analysis of malt barley contracting opportunities between Canadian farmers and U.S. maltsters in the deregulated environment. Comparative statics and simulation results indicate that some new opportunities for contracting are possible, but the likelihood of favorable conditions for U.S. maltsters to contract with Canadian rather than U.S. farmers is low-between 9% and 35% over a range of possible selection rates. The effects on contracting of the termination of the Canadian grain transportation revenue cap policy and of the relaxation of criteria for the release of new spring wheat varieties are also investigated. While changes to grain transportation policies are not likely to significantly affect favorable conditions for contracting, reducing constraints on Canadian farmers' access to higher yielding wheat varieties could increase the returns from growing spring wheat but decrease the likelihood of contracting for malt barley with U.S. maltsters by an average of 5.3 percentage points.
Introduction 1
Market failure is often cited as a rationale for government intervention, but as Wolf (1979 ) 2 has argued, public policy can also create economic distortions in the form of non-market 3 failures. Earlier, Coase (1964) famously reasoned that policy interventions can, in some 4 instances, be inefficient and wasteful. For example, as noted by Niskanen (1968) , such 5 non-market failures could arise through the creation of public or quasi-public agencies that 6 pursue their own interests at the expense of a greater public interest. Coase argued, 7 therefore, that the criteria for evaluating changes to public policy should not be based on 8 whether the changes are optimal (a first-best solution in the traditional economic welfare 9 paradigm), but an improvement over the existing state of the world. The question we 10 examine in this study is whether the disestablishment of the Canadian Wheat Board, a 11
Crown Corporation, as a single-desk buyer and seller of malt barley affects the 12 development of contracting for the delivery of malt barley between large U.S. malting 13 companies and prairie province farmers and the aggregate benefits from such contracting 14 to these parties. This issue falls firmly within the domain of economic policy questions 15 that both Coase and Wolf believe are important. 16
Government policies, agencies and regulations have shaped many national food and 17 agricultural systems and have had important impacts on international markets. In the 18
Canadian prairie provinces, the Canadian Wheat Board has had a major effect on the 19 structure of agriculture for over 70 years through the use of its single-desk monopsony and 20 monopoly powers to purchase and market malting barley and wheat for human 21 consumption and export. The Canadian Wheat Board's (CWB's) single-desk authority has 22 studies, including those that have examined the deregulation of the Australian dairy 1 including the termination of the rail transportation revenue caps imposed by the 1996 1
Canadian Transportation Act and the relaxation of criteria used in determining whether 2 new crop varieties should be released such as kernel visual distinguishability (KVD) as 3 historically applied to spring wheat. The CWB argued that this criterion was useful in 4 creating a unique brand for Canadian wheat exports, and the criterion may continue to be 5 applied by the Canadian Grains Commission (CGC). The KVD and other CGC criteria 6 have likely adversely affected spring wheat yields in the prairie provinces by constraining 7 western Canadian farmers' access to higher yielding varieties of wheat (Ulrich, Furtan, and 8 Schmitz, 1987) . 9
Empirical results indicate that some malt barley contracting opportunities would 10 exist for farmers in all three prairie provinces under a deregulated marketing structure, 11
suggesting that the CWB may have limited profit maximizing opportunities in North 12
American grain markets. Generally, contracting with U.S. maltsters is most likely to take 13 place in Manitoba, followed by Saskatchewan and Alberta. The major factors affecting 14 contracting conditions are ex ante expectations about barley selection rates, spring wheat 15 yields, and transportation costs. Higher expected selection rates raise the opportunity costs 16 of producing competing crops and increase Canadian farmers' incentives to contract for 17 barley production, while higher spring wheat yields increase their opportunity costs of 18 producing malt barley. Increases in Canadian rail freight rates for grain lower U.S. 19 maltsters' contracting incentives. For example, we show that relative to farmers in Alberta, 20 producers in Saskatchewan and Manitoba are expected to be 4-18 percentage points more 21 likely to contract because they are geographically closer to the U.S. brewers. 22
The results also indicate that higher Canadian grain freight rates, associated with 1 freight rate deregulation, may only have minimal effects on contracting incentives. The 2 reason is that the distance from Canadian farms producing malt barley to the U.S.-3 Canadian border is small relative to the distance from the border to the plants at which U.S. 4 maltsters would take delivery of the grain. In contrast, relaxing controls over the release 5 of new spring wheat varieties, which could result the adoption of higher yielding varieties 6 currently grown in the United States, would reduce the probability that Canadian farms 7 would contract with U.S. maltsters by as much as 11 percentage points. These results 8
provide new insights about the complex relationships between government policies and 9 agricultural market outcomes, especially when those policies restrict marketing 10 opportunities and constrain production management decisions. 11 12
The Changing Policy Environment 13
The contemporary version of the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB) has its roots in the mid-14 1930s. The CWB was given the authority in the 1940s to be a single-desk purchaser and 15 marketer of malt barley and wheat from the prairie provinces, both for domestic human 16 consumption and for all exports of malting barley and wheat. In December 2011, the 17 Conservative Party of Canada, whose platform partly focused on market deregulation, 18 succeeded in obtaining legislation to end the CWB's single-desk authorities, which went 19 into effect on August 1, 2012. This represented a major change in how North American 20 malting barley and wheat markets could function and is likely to have important impacts 21 on market participants and Canadian grain exports. However, the full impacts of this 22 change are currently not fully understood, including the potential impacts on contracting 1 important when the CWB was the sole marketer and exporter of Canadian grains, because 1
Canadian Farmers' Decisions to Contract with U.S. Maltsters 1
A risk neutral representative prairie province farmer is assumed to plant a crop, either malt 2 barley or a competing crop, on one acre of land. The farmer will plant malt barley if the 3 returns (net of production and other costs) from contracting for delivery of the crop exceed 4 the returns from raising the competing crop-spring wheat-on the land. 6 Effectively, 5 the farmer seeks to maximize expected profits and will grow malt barley if the net returns 6 from growing barley, , are larger than the expected net returns from growing wheat, 7
. Let and represent expected per acre yields for barley and wheat, the contract 8 price of malt barley, and the expected cash prices of feed barley and wheat, the 9 cost of growing barley, the cost of contracting, the cost of growing wheat, and λ, the 10 selection rate, lies between zero and one. Cost functions are increasing in expected yields 11 and include both variable and fixed costs. The expected net returns or profits from 12 producing malt barley and wheat are: 13
The farmer is assumed to either contract to grow malt barley or sell spring wheat on the 14 cash market. The selection rate affects the farmer's decision to contract for malt barley 1 because malt barley contracts specify the criteria that must be satisfied for a crop to be 2 accepted for malt. If the farmer's malt barley crop meets these specifications, then the 3 farmer receives a premium price and the farmer's per acre revenue is . Otherwise, the 4 farmer sells the barley for feed on the cash market and receives a per acre revenue of . 5
Typically, > . 6
Under the reasonable assumption that per acre costs of growing malt barley are 7 approximately equal to the costs of growing wheat (North Dakota Statistical Service 8 2012)-that is, ( ) + ( ) = ( )-the farmer will grow malt barley when:
This condition can be expressed as: 11
U.S. Maltsters' Decisions to Contract with Canadian Farmers 12
Maltsters in the United States will source barley from Canada only if it is profitable for 13 them to do so. Thus the representative U.S. maltster seeks to minimize the cost of acquiring 14 malt barley from farmers. The firm's cost of obtaining a unit of barley from any given 15 farmer is: 16
where per unit contracting costs, z, may depend on barley yields in the region from which 17 the barley is being sourced. For a U.S. maltster, prairie province barley contracting costs 18 include transportation costs to U.S. facilities, costs due to Canadian variety registration 1 requirements, and the price of the barley. A risk neutral U.S. maltster will contract with 2 Canadian farmers if it is cheaper to purchase barley from Canada than from the United 3
States. Thus, for a U.S. maltster to source barley from Canada, the following condition 4 must be satisfied: 5
where superscripts identify the country to which each variable applies. 6
Conditions for a Feasible Contract 7
Canadian farmers and U.S. maltsters will contract with each other for malt barley if the 8 minimum malt price a Canadian farmer is willing to accept is less than or equal to the 9 maximum price the U.S. maltster is willing to pay. Contracting occurs when: 10
Equation (6) indicates that contracting between U.S. maltsters and Canadian farmers 11 depends on the expected selection rate, Canadian and U.S. wheat prices, wheat and malt 12 barley yields, and the costs of contracting in the Canadian and U.S. markets. 13
Comparative static effects of shocks to expected yields, prices and selection rates 14 in the Canadian and U.S. markets for wheat and barley are presented and discussed 15 in the technical appendix. 16 17
Data Description and the Simulation Model 18
The provisions of the Marketing Freedom for Grain Farmers Act were implemented in 19 August of 2012. As a result, currently it is infeasible to directly measure the effects on 20 contracting between U.S. maltsters and prairie province farmers for the production and 1 delivery of malting barley resulting from the end of the CWB's single-desk authority. 2 However, historical yield, price, and transaction cost information can be used in 3 conjunction with the model presented above to simulate likely market conditions and 4 provide insights about the distributional properties of contracting outcomes. Our analysis 5 focuses on identifying incentives for such contracting in the prairie provinces of Alberta, 6
Manitoba, and Saskatchewan and three U.S. states-Idaho, Montana, and North Dakota. 7
These six regions produce most of the barley grown in each country, accounting for 8 approximately 90% of total Canadian production and 70% of total U.S. production. 9
Barley and spring wheat yields and prices were obtained from the Canadian Grains 10 Council (CGC) and the USDA National Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS) for the 11 periods 1964-2012 and 1974-2012, respectively. 8 All Canadian yield data were converted 12 from kilograms per hectare to bushels per acre using the CGC's conversion factors: 36.744 13 bushels of wheat and 45.92 bushels of barley per metric ton. To estimate unbiased yield 14 distributions using historical data, we need to account for technological advances over farmers in all the prairie provinces received payments from pooled accounts, resulting in 5 every farmer facing the same price within a particular marketing year.
9 Different price 6 pools represented the premiums and discounts that farmers received based on the grade of 7 the delivered grain.
10 For example, there were three pools of spring wheat prices (1 CWRS, 8 2 CWRS, and 3 CWRS) and after 2004, feed barley prices were divided into two pools (1 9 CW Feed Barley A and 1 CW Feed Barley B). We assume that a typical farmer is unable 10 to precisely predict the overall quality of their grain and is likely to receive some weighted 11 average across all price pools. Consequently, our Canadian spring wheat and barley prices 12 represent an average value across all pools. Canadian prices are converted into U.S. dollars 13 using the Bank of Canada noon spot rate average exchange rate. These and U.S. market 14 prices are then converted to 2012 constant dollars using the consumer price index provided 15 by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (U.S. Department of Labor). 16
Rail Distance and Transportation Cost Estimates 17
Transporting malt barley from U.S. and Canadian production regions is assumed to be an 18 important variable cost for a U.S. malting firm. Figure 1 shows the Canadian and U.S. 19 growing regions (marked by a filled circle) and the delivery destinations of U.S. brewing 1 companies located in Golden, CO and St. Louis, MO (marked by a star). 11 The approximate 2 routes are represented by lines and are differentiated by the distance from the centroid of a 3
Canadian growing region to major U.S.-Canada border rail hubs (solid line) and from the 4 border to the final destination (dashed and dotted lines). Table 1 shows the total shipping 5 distances and associated costs for delivering grain from Canadian and U.S. barley 6 production regions to U.S. malting locations. Figure 1 show that the proportional distance 7 that grain must travel in Canada is substantially shorter than the proportion of total 8 transportation that occurs in the United States. 9 A U.S. malting firm's total transportation costs are assumed to be a function of rail 10 rates and total distance from each source location, which we assume to be the centroid of 11 grain elevator locations in each state or province.
12 Historical Canadian rail rate data were 12 and U.S. rail rates represent marginal shipping costs from the border and from U.S. barley 1 production regions to the U.S. malting firms. 2
Rail distances for these routes, which are not publicly available, were estimated 3 using nearby road distances. Specifically, we first obtained actual rail distances across 260 4 location combinations using the Union Pacific online rail distance calculator. For the same 5 location combinations, we used the Google Maps directions feature to determine road 6 distances. Comparing these values to the actual rail distances, we found that, on average, 7 road distances underestimated rail mileage by 11%. Thus we estimated rail distances from 8 the assumed origins and destinations by first obtaining the road distance for each route and 9 multiplying it by a factor of 1.11. 10
Accounting for Price and Yield Dependence 11
Historical price, yield, and transportation cost data can be used to empirically characterize 12 the distributional properties of each variable in a particular region. Then, draws from the 13 specified distributions would represent possible production and market realizations, which 14 can be used to identify when conditions are favorable for malt barley contracting. Table 2 presents a summary of distributional fit statistics for Canadian and U.S. 3 price, yield, and transportation cost data. If the majority of the tests failed to reject the null 4 hypothesis of a particular distribution, then that distribution was used. If both assumed 5 distributions were not rejected or both were statistically rejected at a 10% level, then a beta 6 distribution was assumed to characterize yields and a lognormal distribution to characterize 7 prices. The results of the distribution tests indicate that all crop prices and transportation 8 costs can be characterized by lognormal distributions, and yields can be characterized by a 9 beta distribution in all but three locations (Idaho, North Dakota, and Manitoba).
14 After 10 determining each variable's density function, empirical distribution functions were used to 11 estimate the parameters that provided the best fit to the observed historical data (see 12
Johnson, Kotz, and Balakrishnan 1994 for a description of distributional parameters). Table  13 3 provides descriptive statistics of the estimated marginal distributions for each yield, price, 14 and transportation cost variable and the estimated distributional parameters. 15
In addition to determining historical marginal distributions, it is also important to 16 consider the potential for correlations among prices and yields within and across locations. 15 Interestingly, there is no statistical evidence of dependence among spring wheat 7 yields and prices and among barley yields and prices (i.e., we cannot reject that 8
[ , ] = 0 or
[ , ] = 0). Wheat yields and prices may be uncorrelated 9 because wheat is a global commodity and changes in U.S. and Canadian production are not 10 sufficiently large to have significant effects on world wheat prices. Chambers (2004), who 11 also reports weak interdependence among barley prices and yields, argues that barley prices 12 are more closely linked to corn prices because corn and barley are substitutes in animal 13 feeds. 14 We use a copula function to account for these relationships and simulate values 15 from the joint multivariate distributions of yields and prices. Copulas provide a relatively 16 simple and flexible approach to accommodate high dimensional correlation structures 17 among stochastic variables. Specifically, joint distributions can be characterized as the 18 product of independent marginal probability densities and a unique copula function. For 19 example, the joint yield distribution across locations can be characterized as: 20
where � 1 , 2 , … , � represents the joint distribution of yields across locations, � � 1 is the marginal distribution of yields in location , (⋅) is the copula function, and is the 2 copula function's dependence parameters, which characterize the dependence structure 3 among the marginal density functions. By estimating empirical Spearman correlation 4 structures among yields and among prices and using them to parameterize the copula 5 function, we are able to simulate individual yield and price outcomes for each location 6 while preserving historical rank correlations among those variables within and across 7 locations. 8 9
Simulation Results 10
Using a Gaussian copula function, we simulate 5,000 yield, price, and transportation cost 11 values for each region, each of which represent draws from distributions about which malt 12 barley contracting participants have ex ante expectations. 16 These data are used to 13 determine the lower and upper price bounds under which contracting in the deregulated 14 North American malt barley markets is possible. The lower bound represents the price 15 threshold below which a farmer would not be willing to accept a contract and the upper 16 bound is the highest price at which a U.S. malting firm is willing to offer a contract. 17
Specifically, we evaluate the condition 18
where, for any price or yield variable, x, � represents a simulated value; ̂ is the simulated 2 rail rate in country ; ̂ is the estimated rail mileage traveled in country (and invariant 3 across simulated draws); and all other variables are as described above. 4
For each set of simulated prices, yields, and transportation costs, we evaluate 5 whether or not the upper bound exceeds the lower bound in equation (8) to determine 6 whether conditions are favorable for U.S. malting firms to contract with Canadian farmers. 7
The evaluations are carried out for farmers in each prairie province relative to farmers in 8 Idaho, Montana, or North Dakota. Contracting conditions are evaluated for selection rates 9 ranging from 51% to 99%. Gustafson (2006) suggests that selection rates in the range of 10 51% to 65% are typical of dryland conditions, while selection rates between 80% and 95% 11 are more typical for malt barley planted on irrigated land. Selection rates from 66% to 84% 12 are assumed to represent atypically favorable dryland conditions. We restrict the simulated 13 data to include only observations where the minimum farm price for malting barley is 14 greater than the price of feed barley. The contract decision is based on farmers' and firms' 15 expectations about future price and yield conditions, and it is unlikely that farmers will 16 choose to establish a contract if they believe that feed barley prices will exceed malt barley 1 prices.
2
We carry out the following simulations. First, under the assumption that 3 transportation cost, yield, and price distributions, and the correlation structures between 4 those variables, are those estimated from historical data, we simulate the effects of allowing 5 for contracting between Canadian farmers and U.S. maltsters. In the second set of 6 simulations, we allow for potential changes in Canadian transportation costs. We then 7 examine the impacts of relaxed varietal control policies on changes to spring wheat yield 8 distributions.
9

Contracting in the Absence of the CWB Single-Desk Authority 10
In the absence of a CWB single-desk grain marketing authority, we find that market 11 conditions would sometimes be conducive for contracting between U.S. malting firms and 12 prairie province farmers, but these conditions do not occur frequently. For each selection 13 rate, conditions favorable for contracting between Canadian farmers and U.S. maltsters 14 occur most frequently between the Missouri maltster and farmers in Manitoba. On average, 15 such conditions occur in between 23% and 35% of the total simulations. Favorable 16 conditions for contracting between the Colorado maltster and Manitoba farmers occur in 17 only 13% to 22% of the total. For farmers in Saskatchewan, favorable conditions occurred 1 in 20% to 32% of the simulations for contracting with the Missouri maltster and in 17% to 2 28% of the simulations for contracting with the Colorado maltster. Favorable conditions 3 for contracting are observed least frequently for farmers in Alberta, occurring in only 9% 4 to 19% of the simulations for contracting with either the Missouri or Colorado maltster. 5 Figure 2 shows the proportion of total simulations for which market conditions 6 would make contracting feasible between farmers in each of the three prairie provinces and 7 the two U.S. malting firms over the range of selection rates. As shown by the comparative 8 static results presented in the Appendix, the frequency with which favorable conditions 9 occur is positively correlated with selection rates. Ceteris paribus, the expected benefits 10 from planting barley increase when there is an increase in the probability of producing a 11 barley crop with characteristics that would make it suitable for malt. Figure 2 also shows 12 that conditions favorable for contracting consistently occur more frequently for contracts 13 between the Missouri maltster and Saskatchewan and Manitoba farmers. On average, 14 conditions favorable for contracting with the Missouri maltster occur 3 to 12 percentage 15 points more frequently than for contracting with the Colorado maltster. This result reflects 16 that relative to U.S. producers with whom the U.S. maltsters would otherwise contract, 17
Missouri maltsters would have greater cost advantages to contract with Canadian farmers 18 from these two provinces. The low frequency with which conditions favorable for 19 contracting occur between either of the U.S. maltsters and farmers in Alberta suggests that 20 transaction costs have a dominant role in the U.S. maltsters' contracting decisions. 21 Table 4 presents the average of the lower bound prices that occur when conditions 1 are favorable for contracting over the range of selection rates. The results indicate that the 2 average lower bound prices at which contracting occurs in Manitoba are higher than those 3 in Saskatchewan and Alberta, and the lowest average lower bound prices are observed in 4
Alberta. Table 4 also shows the average upper bounds on the prices U.S. maltsters would 5 offer farmers from each prairie province. The average upper bound price offered by the 6 Colorado maltster is lowest for farmers in Alberta, who are most distant from the plant, 7 higher for farmers in Manitoba, and highest for farmers in Saskatchewan, who are closest 8 to the plant. The average upper bound price offered by the Missouri maltster is also lowest 9 for farmers in Alberta, who are most distant from that plant, higher for farmers in 10 Saskatchewan, and highest for farmers in Manitoba, who are closest to the Missouri plant. 11
These results indicate the importance of location and transportation costs in the contracting 12 decision.
13
Contracting in a Deregulated Freight Rate Environment 14
The importance of transportation costs suggests that relaxing the revenue caps on Canadian (8) and we recalculate these prices to evaluate the effects increased 5
Canadian freight rates on the frequency of contracting between U.S. maltsters and prairie 6 province farmers. 7 Figure 3 presents the simulation results over the range of selection rates, showing 8 the frequencies with which contracting occurs without the CWB single-desk authority but 9 when the current cap on Canadian freight rates is imposed and when those freight rates 10 increase by 4%. The deregulation of Canadian grain freight rates has only a trivial effect 11 (less than a 1 percentage point reduction) on the frequency with which contracting would 12 occur at every selection rate. As suggested in the Figure 1 map and by the shipping cost 13 estimates reported in Table 1 , the result reflects the fact that freight costs incurred in 14 Canada only account for approximately 15% of the total delivery costs from the prairie 15 provinces to the two U.S. maltsters. However, although the direct impacts of changes in 16
Canadian grain transportation policies on shipping costs and the frequency with which 17 contracting may occur are small, those changes could have indirect effects by altering the 18 relative costs and returns to farmers associated with other commodities such as spring 19 wheat.
The Effects of Relaxing Varietal Control Policies for Spring Wheat 1
The likelihood that contracting for malt barley will occur between U.S. maltsters and 2
Canadian farmers also depends on spring wheat yields, which affect the minimum price at 3 which those farmers will contract for malt barley production. Spring wheat yields in the 4 prairie provinces appear to have been adversely affected by the application of varietal 5 controls such as those associated with kernel visual distinguishability. For example, Ulrich 6 (1987) suggests that less strict varietal restrictions on spring wheat could increase Canadian 7 farmers' opportunities to plant higher yielding spring wheat varieties with substantial 8 effects on realized yields. Consequently, the data generation process described by the 9 historical spring wheat yield distribution may change as a result of the new policy. 10
To simulate the effects of relaxing the CGC criteria applied for the release of spring 11 wheat varieties, we re-specify the parameters of the spring wheat marginal distributions for 12 Alberta, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan to reflect the distributional properties of average 13 These results indicate that, compared to freight rate deregulation, access to higher 14 yielding spring wheat varieties is likely to have a larger impact on malt barley contracting 15 between Canadian farmers and U.S. maltsters. Moreover, while deregulated higher grain 16 freight rates are likely to reduce the net returns to Canadian farmers (and their economic 17 welfare) from both malt barley and spring wheat production, increased access to spring 18 wheat varieties has a different effect. Contracting with U.S. brewers for malt barley 19 becomes less likely because higher wheat yields would make the crop's production more 20 profitable, increasing the opportunity costs of raising malt barley. The net effect would 1 almost surely be an increase in economic welfare for western Canadian farmers who raise 2 spring wheat and barley. 3 4
Conclusions 5
This study examines the incentives for contracting for malt barley between farmers in the 6 prairie provinces and U.S. brewing companies in the absence of a CWB with single-desk 7 authorities for malt barley. The research, therefore, falls firmly in the scope of the relevance 8 and broader perspectives that Coase (1964) and Wolf (1979) called for from economic 9
analyses. That is, we consider the possibility that moderating or removing regulation of a 10 market by a government or quasi-government agency, such as the CWB's single-desk 11 authority for marketing barley in the prairie provinces, may result in an improvement of 12 economic welfare. 13
We develop a theoretical model of contracting decisions between western Canadian 14 farmers and U.S. maltsters that accounts for market conditions, including crop prices, crop 15 yields, uncertainty about crop quality (reflected in selection rates), and transactions costs. 16
A simulation model based on the theoretical analysis is developed, which is calibrated 17 using historical data on crop prices and yields in the Canadian Provinces of Alberta, 18
Manitoba, and Saskatchewan and the U.S. states of Idaho, Montana and North Dakota. 19
Using Monte Carlo simulations in which draws are made from a copula function, the 20 empirical model is used to estimate the frequency with which Canadian farmers and U.S. 21 maltsters will have incentives to contract for malt barley. 22
Western Canadian farmers may face new opportunities for marketing grains in the 1 absence of a CWB with single-desk marketing authority. However, the results of the 2 simulation analysis indicate that market conditions suitable for contracting for malt barley 3 production and delivery between western Canadian farmers and U.S. maltsters occur 4 relatively infrequently. The likelihood that market conditions will be favorable to 5 contracting ranges from 13% to 35% in Manitoba and from 17% to 32% in Saskatchewan, 6 with higher frequencies associated with higher selection rates. The likelihood that 7 contracting will occur in Alberta ranges from 9% to 19%, because farmers in Alberta are 8 relatively far from the U.S. companies' delivery points compared to farmers in the major 9 U.S. barley production regions of Idaho, Montana, and North Dakota. 10
The likelihood that contracting between western Canadian farmers and U.S. 11 maltsters will take place also depends on other aspects of grain market regulation in 12
Canada. If the revenue caps established by the 1996 Canadian Transportation Act were 13 discontinued and rail costs for shipping Canadian grain were to rise by 4% (as estimated 14 by Vercammen 1999), then Canadian malt barley contracting opportunities would not be 15 significantly affected. This result reflects the fact that the rail costs of shipping barley to 16 the U.S.-Canadian border constitute a relatively small proportion of the total cost of 17 moving grain to the two U.S. maltsters. However, ending the transportation revenue cap 18 could have substantial adverse impacts on farm gate prices for Canadian spring wheat 19 exported through Vancouver or the Great Lakes by raising rail freight rates for spring 20 wheat. These potential effects are not accounted for in this study but have been considered 21 by others (for example, see Fulton 2006) . 22
Varietal release policies for spring and other wheat classes may also affect the 1 likelihood that contracting for malt barley will occur between western Canadian farmers 2 and U.S. maltsters. However, in the new institutional environment, a continued focus on 3 restrictive criteria for the release of new varieties through the Canadian Grains 4
Commission's varietal approval process may constrain technology adoption by Canadian 5 farmers, resulting in foregone revenue opportunities (Ulrich 1987) . Modifying the varietal 6 approval process to allow registration of higher yielding wheat varieties is likely to improve 7 the returns to planting wheat, but would also increase the opportunity costs of planting malt 8 barley and raise the minimum price at which a prairie province farmer would contract for 9 the delivery of barley with brewers. The results of the simulation analysis indicate that 10 these changes would substantially reduce the frequency with which contracting occurs in 11
Manitoba (by an average of 5 percentage points) and Saskatchewan (by an average of 11 12 percentage points). 13
While the results of this study suggest that some potential exists for both Canadian 14 farmers and U.S. brewers to benefit from increased direct contracting opportunities, 15 changes to CWB's single-desk authority, grain transportation policies, and the varietal 16 licensing program could have other effects. For example, prices received for domestic sales 17
by Canadian malt barley farmers may decline if those prices were sufficiently enhanced by 18 the CWB's ability to mitigated adverse effects on malt barley prices resulting from the 19 oligopsony structure in the North American brewing market. However, a comprehensive 20 assessment of welfare effects associated with ending the single-desk authority requires 21 modeling the resulting impacts on the exercise of market power given the current structure 22 of the malting industry. In a dynamic context, it would also require an evaluation of 1 potential changes associated with mergers and increased concentration in the Canadian and 2 U.S. malting barley sectors. Both analyses would entail quantitative estimation of the 3 impacts on malt barley planting, production, exports, and domestic consumption within a 4 broader multi-market spatial modeling framework. Distributional assumptions are tested using historical data from the Canada Grains Council and United States Department of Agriculture and then a marginal distribution for simulation is chosen if at least two of the four distributional tests fail to reject the null hypothesis. If the null hypothesis is rejected for both distribution assumptions, then the beta distribution is assumed for yields and the lognormal distribution is assumed for prices. 1 CWRS, 2 CWRS, 3 CWRS, and 1 CW feed barley represent price pools for Canadian spring wheat and barley, respectively. Cost to ship grain by rail Lognormal 0.073 0.013 Notes: All yields are in bushels per acre and all prices are in 2012 U.S. dollars. 1 CWRS, 2 CWRS, 3 CWRS, and 1 CW feed barley represent price pools for Canadian spring wheat and barley, respectively. The costs to ship grain by rail are in USD per metric ton per mile. Notes: Farm prices are the means of the lowest prices Canadian farmers would be willing to accept when malt barley contracts are possible; that is, when farm price is less than the highest price a U.S. maltster is willing to pay (firm price). Firm prices are malting firms' mean maximum willingness to pay. Contract prices are in USD per bushel. 
